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Effects of the WTO and Free Trade Agreements on Japonica Rice Markets 
 
Three trade policy changes underway and on the horizon have the prospect to alter global markets 
for japonica rice.  This paper considers likely global market effects of expansion of access into the 
market in Japan and Korea, and reduced subsidy for japonica rice (among other crops) in the United 
States.  We consider these policy changes in the context of a proposed Doha Development Agenda 
WTO agreement and one potential outcome of the proposed Free Trade Agreement between Korea 
and the United States (KUS-FTA).  We use an equilibrium displacement model to ask how market 
prices, quantities and other aggregates change as a result of policy changes.  The global model 
includes six aggregates in the world market, China, Korea, Japan, the United States, other exporters 
and other importers.  Under the WTO scenario that U.S. subsidies decrease by 25 percent in 
addition to the full implementation of quota expansion in Korea and Japan, our results indicate that: 
1) U.S. production falls by about 16 percent, and U.S. exports fall by about 51 percent, 2) the world 
price rises by about 1 percent, and 3) China’s exports increase about 43 percent.  If no WTO 
agreement occurs, there would be no expansion of Japan’s imports and no reduction in U.S. rice 
subsidy even though Korea must still expand its WTO-multilateral quota.  A KUS-FTA is likely to 
add a country-specific U.S. quota of another 4 percent of domestic consumption.  In this case, world 
prices rise by only 0.3 percent.  In general, world price effects are small and this is mainly due to 
the strong Chinese supply response.  However, it is important to note that the associated changes in 
Chinese japonica rice production are at most about one percent of the Chinese baseline production.  
This implies the dominant role of China in the world japonica rice market.   
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Rice is a major staple for more than a billion people.  It is also less traded internationally than other 
major grains.  About 400 million tons of rice are produced and consumed globally each year.  About 
60 percent of that is produced and consumed within India and China, and Indonesia and Bangladesh 
produce and consume another 15 percent of global rice supply.  Thus, 75 percent of world rice is 
grown and consumed in places where it evolved as the staple food.  The amount of rice that trades 
across national borders, currently about 25 million metric tons is only about six percent of world 
rice production. Rice production and trade is of two major types—japonica rice and indica rice.  
Japonica rice is comprised of short and medium grain rice varieties that are relatively glutinous and 
are the traditional staples in Japan, Korea and parts of Northern China.  Indica rice varieties tend to 
have longer kernel lengths, are less glutinous and are the traditional staples in the more southern 
parts of Asia.    3 
Global developments in the market for japonica rice have played a central role in the WTO.  
In 1995, Korea and Japan were allowed to use quotas rather than tariffication to implement World 
Trade Organization (WTO) commitments under the Uruguay Round agreement.  Taiwan also began 
to open its market in 2002, its first year in the WTO.  The amount of market access into these 
countries currently ranges about 1 million metric tons a year.  This represents significant additional 
access in the relatively thin market for japonica rice.  Even though imports into these countries 
continue to be restricted, the significance of global development in the market for japonica rice is 
obvious.  (China also pledged to allow imports of japonica rice specifically and separately in its 
WTO accession agreement in 2002, but China has been a net exporter of japonica rice.) 
This paper explores some important relationships in that market and considers the likely 
impacts of some policy adjustments that are underway or may be likely in coming years, including 
final implementation of the Korean quota expansion under its Uruguay round commitments, a new 
WTO agreement and the proposed Korea and United States Free Trade Agreement (KUS-FTA).  In 
order to evaluate these potential policy changes, we first review the market and international trade 
policy for japonica rice on a global basis.  We then examine alternative policy scenarios against a 
status quo baseline.  In particular, we consider likely global market effects of expansion of access 
into the market in Japan and Korea and reduced subsidy for japonica rice in the United States. 
I. Trade liberalization and global market for japonica rice  
Now that China and Taiwan are members of the World Trade Organization, policies of all 
the major participants in the market for japonica rice are governed by WTO agreements and rules.    
Japan is committed to provide access for about 0.68 million metric tons under a “low” tariff.  Japan 
applies a prohibitively high tariff to any potential imports above this quantity.  Japan imports from a 
variety of sources, but traditionally has imported almost half of its total from California.  South 
Korea is committed to provide access for import about 0.2 million metric tons under its WTO rice 
quota.  Korea has also imported from a variety of sources in recent years including from the United   4 
States and China.  Little, if any, imported rice has entered the normal marketing channels for table 
rice in either Japan or Korea. 
Under their WTO accession agreements China and Taiwan provided TRQ access to their 
domestic markets and agree that some portion of the potential imports would be handled outside the 
state trading enterprise system.  As a part of its accession commitment, Taiwan agreed to low-tariff 
import access of about 127 million metric tons.  Even though the percentage rate of import is higher 
than Korea and Japan, this total is small relative to imports of Japan or Korean.  The access 
agreement for China included separate commitments for japonica rice in the form of a tariff rate 
quota, but the quantities specified have not been binding and are not expected to be binding while 
China remains a net exporter of japonica rice. 
The global WTO negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), remain under way.  
The major issues include reduction of trade barriers and agricultural subsidies (WTO, 2004).  The 
interim agreements and current negotiating positions of important negotiating coalitions suggest that 
the highest tariff rates will be reduced most with the highest bound tariff rates declining by 50 
percent or more (a so-called Swiss formula approach).  This approach will be applied in “bands” 
rather than as a single formula.  Tariff rate quota (TRQ) quantities will also be expanded.    Smaller 
tariff cuts and slower expansion of the quota quantities for tariff rate quotas will be allowed for 
sensitive products.  There is no doubt that japonica rice will be proposed for the “sensitive” or 
“special” categories by major importers such as Japan and Korea. Doubling of the access quantities 
under TRQs are likely outcomes, with tariff continuing to be prohibitive.  (As noted below Korea is 
likely to maintain its absolute quota.) 
Debate over domestic support programs has raised many complex issues.  The bottom line is 
likely to be some tightening of what payments can be considered exempt from reform (green box) 
and some allowance for programs that are more than minimally trade distorting, but yet do not 
contribute to production distortion as much as full production subsidies (blue box).  With those   5 
changes, there will likely be limits on overall subsidies in the less distorting category (blue box) and 
substantial cuts in the category of subsidies that are considered most trade distorting (amber box). 
For the major importers who restrict imports quantitatively (as long as import quotas remain 
binding as in Japan and Korea), their domestic subsidy programs have little impacts on international 
trade.  Further, among significant exporters of japonica rice, China, Australia and Egypt have no 
significant domestic subsidies for rice.  However, the United States does have major subsidies for 
rice that are similar to those for other major field crops such as cotton, corn, barley, sorghum, wheat 
and soybeans (Sumner, 2003).  For japonica rice, the subsidy reductions in the United States are 
particularly important.  The United States does not provide significant production subsidy for fruits, 
tree nuts, vegetables, seed crops, wild rice, irrigated pasture or hay.  This is important because some 
of these are significant alternative crops in the japonica rice-growing region of California.  The U.S. 
subsidy programs are complex and include a number of features that were renewed and adjusted in 
2002 (Sumner, 2003).  The recent WTO dispute over cotton also suggests that substantial reductions 
in trade distorting subsidies will result from the negotiations (Sumner 2005; WTO, 2005).  Cuts in 
the aggregate measure of support by 50 percent or more are likely.  In addition, there will be shift of 
some subsidy programs into less production distorting forms.  The bottom line is likely to be 25 
percent cut in the effective price-distorting effects of subsidy for japonica rice. 
II. A simulation model: potential policy adjustments in japonica rice 
  To represent the essential features of world japonica markets, while keeping the model simple, 
each country or group of countries trading japonica rice in the world market is set as either a net 
importer or net exporter.  For each market participant, the input markets and the output markets are 
specified with a series of supply and demand functions, and then the market adjustments in response 
to the introduction of an alternative policy are described.  In modeling these adjustments, we use a 
partial equilibrium displacement model specified in log linear form (Alston, Norton and Pardey,   6 
1995; Hertel, 1989).
1  In the context of world japonica rice, trade liberalization on importing 
countries mainly centers on relaxing restrictive border policies, and the policy instruments used to 
represent trade liberalization include minimum access quotas and ad valorem tariffs.  To conform to 
the important trade distorting policies noted above, our model allows the possibility of domestic 
subsidies for rice production for exporters.  
We use the following notational convention.  Superscript i denotes a country or a group of 
countries with i=1,…,I.  Of these, there are iq net importers and (I-iq) net exporters.  Importers are 
differentiated into those, i=1,…,it, that impose tariffs on imported rice, and the rest, i= it+1,…,iq, 
that import rice according to the binding quotas.  (Note that importers with no import restrictions 
are included in the group with a zero tariff.)  In the context of a single output, rice, we consider 
three inputs—labor, material input, and land—denoted as L, M, and K, respectively.  
  The basic structure of the model is given in equations (1)-(10).  
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1 The basic framework is due to Muth (1964).  Citations are numerous, and we do not provide additional cites here due 
to space limitation.   7 
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  Equation (1) represents domestic consumer demand for rice, where D
i is the demand for rice 
in country i, p
i is the domestic price for rice, and 
i
D z  is a vector of demand shifters.  Equation (2) 
determines the level of rice production in country i by equating the marginal cost to the farmers’ 
effective price under the assumption of perfect competition.  The effective price is the sum of the 
domestic price and effective per unit subsidy rate, 
i m .
2  The total cost is a function of a vector of 
input prices, 
i w , and the level of output, 
i Y .  Equation (3) represents derived input demand where 
i
j x  is derived demand for input j devoted to rice production in country i.  Equations (4) and (5) 
represent the supply sides of labor and land inputs in country i, with 
i
L z and 
i
K z  denoting the vectors 
of supply shifters for the supply of L and K, respectively.  The supply function for material input is 
simply given by its exogenous price, guided by an economic principle that, over an intermediate or 
long time horizon, changes in quasi-rent are captured by labor and land, not material input, which is 
supplied elastically to a single agricultural industry. 
Equation (6) represents the equilibrium condition in the domestic rice market, where 
domestic demand for rice equals total domestic production of rice plus net imports, IM
i, minus net 
exports, EX
i.  Since we employ the net amount for each county’s trade figure, either IM
i or EX
i is 
zero for each i.  Equation (7) determines the domestic price of rice for the rice importing countries 
under the tariff policy, where p
w is the world price and 㱀
i is the ad valorem tariff on imported rice.  
Equation (8) applies to the countries that import rice under a binding quota, and defines imports for 
those countries.  Equation (9) defines the domestic rice price for the exporting countries.  In these 
countries, no trade distortion means that the domestic price facing consumers equals the world 
                                                   
2 This formulation of effective price in equation (2) intends to describe the policy of a county such as the United States, 
where substantial domestic subsidies are provided to rice farmers (when no subsidies are provided, 
i m  equals zero).    8 
price.  Finally, equation (10) represents the equilibrium condition for the world market, that is, the 
total rice export equals the total rice import.   
Totally differentiating equations (1)-(10) and using log differentials to convert to elasticity 
form yields the following linear elasticity model.  With the exception of the carets that denote 
proportional changes, all previous notation applies to equations (1’) through (10’).   
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Throughout the equations (1’)-(10’), the following notation is used; 
i h  and 
i
j l  are country 
i’s demand elasticities with respect to the own price and each of demand shifting variables; 
i
p a  and 
i am  are the shares of the market price and subsidy in the effective price (
i i p m + ); 
i
n v  is the cost 
share of input n; 
i
jn s  is the Allen elasticity of substitution between inputs j and n; 
i
Lj e  (
i




K r ) are the elasticities representing the changes in the wage (land rental rates) with respect to   9 
each of shifting factors and own quantity; 
i
Y b , 
i
IM b , and 
i
EX b  are the shares of domestic production, 
net imports, and net exports, respectively, in country i’s domestic consumption of rice.  That is, for 
the net importing countries, the sum of 
i
Y b  and 
i
IM b  is one (with 
i
EX b =0) and for the net exporting 
countries, the sum of 
i
Y b  and 
i
EX b -  (with 
i
IM b =0) is one; 
i w  = 1+
i t ; 
i g  and 
i h  are the i-th 
country’s import and export shares in the world market.    
Finally, bilateral agreements such as the KUS-FTA involve specific countries and thus, the 
KUS-FTA was not incorporated in the general model.  However, Korea’s country specific quota can 
be easily incorporated in the model as quantity q added to the equations representing relevant 
countries.  Those equations are eq. (6) for i=US, eq. (8) for i=Korea, and eq. (10) representing the 
world market equilibrium.  The corresponding log differential equations also have additional terms 
in the right side of the equation.  Those additional terms are: 
us us
q q b Ⱡ -  in (6’), 
k q Ⱡ  in (8’) and  
us usq h Ⱡ -  in (10’), where 
us
q b  is the share of q based on US consumption, 
us q Ⱡ  is the ratio of q based 
on US exports, 
k q Ⱡ  is the ratio of q based on total Korean imports, and 
us h  is the share of US 
exports in the world market. 
III. Empirical implementation 
We assume six players in the world japonica rice market, three net exporters including 
China, the U.S., and an aggregate of the rest of the world exporters (ROWX) and three net 
importers including Korea, Japan and an aggregate of the ROW importers (ROWI).
3  Our 
simulation uses 2014 as a base period, which represent the end period of the 10-year policy 
implementation period.  The projections to 2014 are based on the FAPRI preliminary baseline for 
2005.
4  However, FAPRI does not provide figures for japonica rice separately.  Thus, in countries 
                                                   
3 Among the significant world market players, Australia and Egypt are included in the aggregate export group and 
Taiwan is included in the aggregate importer group. 
4 Source:  http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/BaselineReview2004   10 
and groups of countries that produce both japonica and other rice, we adjust for various japonica 
shares to arrive at the numbers presented in Table 1.
5   
In assigning the elasticity values, we relied on previous empirical investigations and when 
previous studies are not available, we relied on our interpretations on the most relevant empirical 
evidence.  In the specification of own Marshallian price elasticities of rice demand, one 
consideration important is the substitution possibility in consumption between japonica and indica 
rice.  A higher substitution possibility implies a greater demand response to a price change in the 
japonica rice market.  This implies that the price elasticities are less elastic for Korea and Japan 
where little substitution between japonica and indica rice exists than those for the rest of the 
countries.  Guided by this and other existing studies, we specified the own demand elasticities to be 
-0.7 for China, -0.2 for Korea, -0.2 for Japan, -0.5 for the United States, -0.6 for ROWI, and -0.6 for 
ROWX (Song and Carter; Cramer et al.). 
The model also requires estimates for the Allen elasticities of input substitution.  These are 
not available from the econometric literature.  Based on common observations that substitution 
between land and labor or between land and material input tends to be more limited than 
substitution between labor and material input, we set the elasticity of input substitution to be one 
between labor and material input but 0.5 for other input pairs.
6  Finally, we specified supply 
elasticities for labor and land inputs.  Our partial equilibrium model implies a relatively elastic input 
supply curves facing individual crop industries.  On the other hand, there exists considerable fixity 
in rice labor and land because there are considerable adjustment costs in shifting from rice to other 
crops and japonica rice tends to be grown in separate locations from indica rice.  We use land and 
labor supply elasticities of 0.6 for all countries.  The implied supply elasticities for output depend 
                                                   
5 Space limitations preclude providing detail on parameter construction.  This information is available in an appendix 
from the authors.  
6  We conducted the sensitivity tests using alternative elasticity values. Results were not sensitive to small variations in 
this parameter.    11 
on the input supply elasticities, the substitution elasticities and the input shares, especially the share 
of manufactured inputs, which have a horizontal supply function facing the japonica rice industry.    
Along with trade policy, another policy consideration in the model is the domestic 
production subsidies, represented by 㯀 in the model.  Of the three exporters, the Unite States is the 
only country that provides a substantial amount of production subsidy for japonica rice in a way that 
affects trade.  In our framework  m a ’s are zero (i.e.,  p a =1) for all countries except for the United 
States.  On average, government transfer payments represent about 40 percent of the U.S. rice 
farmers’ revenue.  However, given that a substantial portion of these payments are not tied directly 
to current rice production, we adopt 0.25 for the value of  m a  for the United States.  
In light of our discussion on the earlier global policy section, two WTO policy scenarios are 
considered: (1) rice import quotas for both Korea and Japan increase from 2004 levels by 100 
percent in 2014 and; (2) rice import quotas for both Korea and Japan increase by 100 percent in 
2014 and U.S. domestic subsidies for japonica rice decreases by 25 percent in 2014.  Korea 
maintains an absolute quota for rice and has already agreed to expand that quota by 100 percent by 
2014.  Japan imports conform to its quota quantity with a prohibitive tariff on the quantity over the 
minimum access.  We impose no tariff change on ROWI because these countries have low applied 
tariffs in the baseline and many are less developed countries that will make little if any effective 
cuts in applied tariffs following a WTO agreement. 
The other major policy effort that is likely to affect japonica rice markets is the proposed 
free trade agreement between Korea and the United States (USTR, 2006).  Rice trade has extreme 
political sensitivity in Korea as indicated by the maintenance of a quota system and refusal to adopt 
tariffication for rice in the WTO.  At the same time the United States has maintained that the FTA 
must be comprehensive, including rice.  In the face of this seeming impasse we anticipate that by   12 
2014 Korea will be required to expand a country specific quota for the United States under the FTA.  
We specify that quota expansion as 200,000 tons. 
To assess the impacts of the KUS-FTA, we examine three additional policy scenarios.  First, 
a KUS-FTA added to the two WTO agreement scenarios specified above and finally a KUS-FTA 
with no WTO agreement. 
IV. Simulated Effects of the WTO and KUS-FTA for Japonica Rice Markets 
Table 2 presents our simulation results for the five policy scenarios as specified above.  In 
scenario A, Korea and Japan both increase their quota amounts (for Japan, the increase in quota in 
2014 amounts to additional 0.5 million tons and for Korea the additional increase in 2014 is about 
0.2 million tons).  The price in Korea falls by 2.9 percent, the price in Japan falls by 2.5 percent and 
the world price increases by 0.7 percent.  The relatively small price effects are due to the small 
share of increase in access relative to global production and the strong supply response.  Production 
increases by a bit more than one percent in the markets not protected by quotas.  The relatively high 
implied output supply elasticities are due to moderate supply elasticities of land and labor to 
japonica rice production and the fact that materials supply function is infinitely elastic.  Exports are 
more responsive.  China increases its exports by 30 percent and the United States increases exports 
by six percent.  In the second WTO scenario, the United States cuts its domestic support at the same 
time that Korea and Japan improve market access.  U.S. production falls by about 16 percent and 
U.S. exports fall by about 50 percent.  In this case, world price rises by one percent and China 
increases production by 1.7 percent and exports by about 43 percent.  Note that Korean and 
Japanese markets are affected only by the change in their import regime so the effects of scenarios 
A and B are identical for them. 
Adding the KUS-FTA scenario with additional country-specific import quota to the WTO 
shows that the global trade results are not much different from the case of a WTO quota expansion.  
That is, the country-specific nature of the quota is irrelevant to trade flows or prices.  Except for   13 
Korea who are affected by the expanded quota, the only impact is on who receives the quota rent 
from Korean sales, if the institutional arrangement allows quota rent.  Comparing the scenarios A to 
C and B to D, the added imports by Korea cause world price to rise by 0.1 percent more than the 
analogous WTO scenario, and the higher price implies slightly larger more production and exports.  
Finally, the FTA-alone scenario (scenario E in Table 2) shows that the expanding only the Korean 
import access provides much smaller gains than expanding Korean and Japan as in scenario A.  This 
is simply because the FTA increases access by 200,000 tons and the Japanese access gain is more 
than 400,000 tons.  Note further that U.S. exports increase by much less than 200,000 tons even 
though the KUS-FTA quota is specifically allocated to the United States.  The 2.6 percent increase 
in U.S. exports is less than 12,000 tons.  This means that the United States diverts exports from 
other markets to Korea to take advantage or potential quota rents.  It also implies that China and 
ROW exporters expand to take advantage of the other markets that are made available by the 
diversion of the destination of U.S. exports.  
V. Conclusions 
We investigate market effects due to policy changes in world japonica rice markets.  Our 
simulation results represent the market effects due only to potential policy changes, holding all 
other conditions to their baseline projected values.   Our simulations indicate that modest increases 
in import access imply small declines in market price in importing countries and quite small 
increase in world prices.  Our simulation results with respect to China, however, deserve some 
attention.  In each scenario, Chinese exports respond by a huge margin (up to 47 percent).  This 
indicates that the world market sustains relatively a small price shock mainly due to flexibility of 
Chinese supply response to the export market.  Nevertheless, it is also important to notice that the 
associated changes in Chinese japonica rice production are small (at most 1.9 percent).  This again 
indicates the possibility that a small production shock in China may imply a potentially large shock 
in the world market for japonica rice market.    14 
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Table 1. Baseline Quantities for 2014 and Parameters Used in Simulation 
 
A. Baseline Quantities  
  China  Korea  Japan  US  ROWX  ROWI 
rough to milled rice conversion ratio  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.65  0.65 
YEAR 2014 (Million metric tons) 
Production (Y)  32.82  4.66  7.20  1.50  5.50   
Consumption (C)   31.02  4.86  7.70  1.04  4.40   
Exports (EX)  1.80  0.00  0.00  0.46  1.10   
Imports (IM)  0.00  0.20  0.50  0.00  0.00  2.66 
B.  Parameter specification 
  China  Korea  Japan  US  ROWX  ROWI 
Own output demand elasticity  
  -0.7  -0.2  -0.2  -0.5  -0.6  -0.6 
Various shares (Consumption based shares and world market shares) 
     Shares based on domestic consumption 
        Domestic production (Y/C)  1.06  0.96  0.94  1.44  1.25  0.43 
        Export (EX/C)  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.44  0.25  0.00 
        Imports (IM/C)  0.00  0.04  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.57 
     Share in the world market 
        Imports   0.00  0.06  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.79 
        Exports  0.54  0.00  0.00  0.14  0.33  0.00 
Elasticities of input substitution  
        Labor/material  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
        Labor/land  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
        Material/land  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Factor expenditure shares  
        L (labor)  0.43  0.21  0.31  0.11  0.30  0.30 
        M (material)  0.43  0.33  0.55  0.65  0.40  0.40 
        K (land)  0.14  0.46  0.14  0.24  0.30  0.30 
Input supply elasticity              
  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.6  0.6 
Policy parameters  
        Rate of income subsidy  0  0  0  0.25  0  0 
Source:  For baseline and share information, sources are Korean Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry (Statistical Yearbook, 2004), Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), and Economic Research Service (USDA/ERS) (Rice 
Yearbook 2003).  For elasticities, sources are the previous literature.  For additional information 
on parameter construction, contact the corresponding author.   16 
 
Table 2. Effects of WTO deal and Korea-US FTA 
             
   China  Korea  Japan  US  ROWI  ROWX 
Scenario A: Expand import access in Korea and Japan by 100%   
Consumption  -0.5%  0.6%  0.5%  -0.4%  -0.4%  -0.4% 
Domestic price  0.7%  -2.9%  -2.5%  0.7%  0.7%  0.7% 
Production  1.2%  -3.6%  -5.8%  1.6%  1.1%  1.1% 
Imports  --  100.0%  100.0%  --  -1.6%  -- 
Exports  30.6%  --  --  6.0%  --  7.2% 
Scenario B: Expand import access in Korea and Japan by 100% and cut US subsidies 
by 25%   
Consumption  -0.7%  0.6%  0.5%  -0.5%  -0.6%  -0.6% 
Domestic price  1.0%  -2.9%  -2.5%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0% 
Production  1.7%  -3.6%  -5.8%  -15.8%  1.5%  1.5% 
Imports  --  100.0%  100.0%  --  -2.2%  -- 
Exports  42.6%  --  --  -50.6%  --  10.0% 
Scenario C: Expand import access in Korea and Japan by 100% and Korea expands 
country specific quota to US by 200,000 tons under FTA   
Consumption  -0.6%  0.9%  0.5%  -0.4%  -0.5%  -0.5% 
Domestic price  0.8%  -4.4%  -2.5%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8% 
Production  1.4%  -5.3%  -5.8%  1.8%  1.2%  1.2% 
Imports  --  150.0%  100.0%  --  -1.8%  -- 
Exports  35.0%  --  --  6.9%  --  8.2% 
Scenario D: Expand import access in Korea and Japan by 100%, cut US subsidies by 
25%, and Korea expands country specific quota to US by 200,000 tons 
under FTA   
Consumption  -0.8%  0.9%  0.5%  -0.6%  -0.7%  -0.7% 
Domestic price  1.1%  -4.4%  -2.5%  1.1%  1.1%  1.1% 
Production  1.9%  -5.3%  -5.8%  -15.6%  1.7%  1.7% 
Imports  --  150.0%  100.0%  --  -2.4%  -- 
Exports  47.0%  --  --  -49.7%  --  11.1% 
Scenario E: Expand import access in Korea by 100% and Korea expands country 
specific quota to US by 200,000 tons under FTA   
Consumption  -0.2%  0.9%  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.2% 
Domestic price  0.3%  -4.4%  0.0%  0.3%  0.3%  0.3% 
Production  0.5%  -5.3%  0.0%  0.7%  0.5%  0.5% 
Imports  --  150.0%  0.0%  --  -0.7%  -- 
Exports  13.1%  --  --  2.6%  --  3.1% 
Source:  Author simulations 